Philosophers and Theologians
at Odds
THOMAS V. MORRIS

In the past ten or fifteen years, the areas of philosophy of religion and
philosophical theology have been among the fastest growing fields within the
discipline of philosophy. Only a few decades ago, many of the leading philosophers in the world were either openly hostile to religion or else completely indifferent to its concerns. This created a nearly pervasive atmosphere in the
profession and renewed the long-rumored reputation of philosophers as enemies of faith. But now a new breeze is blowing down the halls of the academy.
A significant number of the most active and prominent contemporary philosophers are these days devoting their energies to a careful examination, and even
defense, of many of the traditional tenets of Christian theology. There has
been a great amount of new and exciting work on the concept of God, on the
various divine attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience, on the rational
status of religious belief and on the nature of religious experience. There has
also recently been a development which is even more fascinating and unexpected, given the philosophical climate of previous decades: philosophers have
begun to show deep interest in the distinctive doctrines of the Christian faith,
focusing their attention on such ideas as those of incarnation, trinity, atonement, sanctification and the nature of sin. An immediate result of this is that
we are quickly attaining a new level of conceptual clarity concerning the content
and credibility of these doctrines. Philosophers, for a long time thought of as
nothing more than critics of religious thought, arc now to be numbered among
its champions. At least this is true for a surprising number of contemporary
thinkers.
There is no little irony in the fact that this comes at a time when a number
of respected academic theologians have, purportedly on philosophical grounds,
largely abandoned the traditional claims distinctive of the Christian faith
throughout most of its history. In the writings of some prominent contemporary theologians, the doctrinal foundations of the Church arc labelled as myths,
reinterpreted as symbols or reassessed as grammatical rules merely intended to
govern a particular religious " language-game." As straightforward claims about
the way things are, they seem to be thought of as something of an embarrass-
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ment. This, to put il mildly, is a remarkable turn of affairs. Until fairly recently,
the existential force of the Christian gospel was understood in the context of a
Christian story about God, the world and human beings which, as a conjunction
of claims about the way things are, was believed to be tnte, metaphysically and
morally correct. Of course, the apostles and the authors of the New Testament
documents were not viewed as metaphysicians or moral philosophers. But it
was generally recognized that their message has presuppositions and implications as well as central components which fall within the province of metaphysics and moral philosophy, and which can be very useful when elucidated in the
technical terms appropriate to these important domains of human tho ug ht.
This view of the Christian message is now often termed "proposilionalism"
or "cognitivism" by its theological detractors, and is thought to be a pre-modern mistake which arose only out of a philosophical innocence now long lost.
In fact, anyone who thinks otherwise is nowadays quite often said to be naive,
unsophisticated, a-historical (a charge shortly to be explained) and--nearly everyone's favorite term of disapprobation now that 'heretic' is unfashionablc--a
fundamentalist. How is this aversio n to the tradition's self-understanding on
the part of leading academic theologians to be explained? What motivates
their large scale move away from what they call proposilionalism? What, if
anything, grounds their charges? In light of the wide divergence between such
theologians and a great many contemporary philosophers on this issue, it may
be worthwhile to examine a bit, however briefly, why it is that some theologians
are now criticizing philosophers for taking the straight forward cognitivism of
the tradition seriously, as providing the fra mework for their own efforts.
A dominant trend in modern theology is to reinterpret the traditional
Christian doctrines as symbols whose function is merely lo express and evoke
certain sorts of evaluative and religious attitudes and e>.peric11ces. R epresenting
one variant of this trend quite candidly and succinctly, John H ick once remarked concerning the central Christian claim that Jesus was, and is, God Incarnate (lhe claim captured in the classical doctrine of the incarnation), that
"the real point and value of the incarnational doctrine is not indicative bul expressive, not to assert a metaphysical facl but to express a valuat ion and evoke
an attitude." 1
This systematic focus on human altitudes and experiences has become so
firmly entrenched in modern theology since the work of Schleiermacher as lo
become a hoary tradition unto itself. In his recent and enormously influential
book, 771e Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck makes some very revealing
comments aboul lhis " long and very notable experiential tradition" in theology.
Expressing at o ne point a very common assessment, he says:
The origins of this tradition in one sense go back to Kant, for he
helped clear the ground fo r its emergence by demolishing the
metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the earlier regnant
cognitive-propositional views. T hat ground-clearing was later
completed for most educated people by scientific developments that
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increased the diffi cult ies of acceptin g literalistic pro positio nal
interpretations of such biblical doctrin es as creation, and by historical
studies that im plied the time-conditioned relativity of all doctrincs.2
These statements from Lindbeck are enlightening in a number of ways.
First of all, there is a conviction expressed here which seems to be widespread among contem porary theologians, the belief that Kant, or Hume, or
both together , some two centuries ago dealt death blows to natural theology
and to the sort of classical theistic metaphysics underlying traditio nal approaches to revelational theology. In a strange way, these philosophers have
become the unlikely patro n saints of current academic theology, as the popular
appraisal of their work has shifted the who le theological enterprise into its now
common non-metaphysical directions. W hat is parti cul arly interesting about the
references theologians make to Kant or H ume is that most often we find the
philosopher merely mentioned, in a somewhat deferential and even slightly appreciative tone, but we rarely, if ever, see an account of precisely which arguments of his are supposed to have accomplished the alleged demolition of cognitivism, and exactly how they may be supposed to have had that effect. In fac t,
I must confess to never having seen in the writ ings of any contem porary theologian the expositio n of a single argument from eit her Hume or Kant, or any
other historical fig ure, fo r that matter, which comes anywhere near to demolishing, or even irreparably damaging trad itional theistic metaphysics, historical
Christian doctrine or the epistemology of what we might call " theological realism" (the construal of theology as a discipline whose intent is to represent religious realities as they, in fact, are). A great number of the fore most contemporary philosophers, who are quite well acquainted with the work of Hume and
Kant, reject this concl usion common amo ng theologians about what their writings show concerning trad itional religious belicf. 3
T he developments of modern science that Lindbeck alludes to no more
clearly proscribe a traditionalist understanding of Christian doctrines than do
the writings of Hume and Kant. His reference, of course, is to scientific developments since the time of Kant, altho ugh he docs not specify the precise developments he finds to be troublesome. It is unlike ly that he has in mind recent
strides in molecular biology, quantum mechanics o r cosmology, altho ug h the
last of these fields has been thought by some to pose challenges to religious
belief. (Of course, just as many have hailed its details as corroborat ing the ancient theistic claims of cosmic design.) But, in any case, Lindbcck's me ntion of
the biblical doctri ne of creatio n indicates that what he probably means to invoke here is mo dern evolutionary theory. If, however, one draws the simple
distinction which must be drawn between the biblical doct1i11c of creation and
the literary representations of creation to be fo und in, for exam pie, th e book of
Genesis, it is unclear how this development of scientific theorizing is supposed
to increase the difficulty of construing a sentence like
(C) Everything in the universe is created by God and depends on him
fo r its existence moment to moment
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as the expression of a proposition which is tru e. How other scie ntific develo pme nts could increase the dif!icully of accepting the rest of C hristian doctrine as
cognitively avai lable propositional truth is even more dif!icult to sec.
In addition to the spect res o f Hume a nd Kant and the appa re ntly bullying
im age of mode rn scie nce, histori cal studies arc cited by Lindbeck as contribu ting to th e downfall of cognitive-propositional views of C hristia n doctrine. Now,
the re a rc ma ny ways in which histo rical st udies since the t ime o f Spinoza might
be thought to have had a negative impact on traditio nal C hristia n tho ught.
First, in refere nce to biblical studies, it might be argued tha t we have discove red the classical Christi an doctrines not t o be clearly present within the biblical corpus. Furth e r, it is some times added, th ey a rc not even hinted at in " th e
ea rliest stra ta" of the core New Testa me nt docum e nts and the ir so urces. And
so, the conclusion is drawn, if we are historically sensitive to the earliest roots
o f the Ch ristian faith, we will recognize the standard Church doct rines to be
late r accretio ns inessenti al Lo, a nd even corrosive o f, the most authe ntic Christ ian witness.
I must admit th at during my own training in biblical studies before I came
to phi losophy, I ofte n wondered whet her it was the heavy hand o f philosophical
presuppositions which, usua lly unack nowledged, guided the work of biblical
scholars, in eve ryt hing from their exegetical a nd criti cal efforts Lo the ir appl icatio n of procedures for dating documents. This is how I suspected it oft e n went:
o theologian o r biblical schola r idc nti!ied in a ny sense as a Ch ristian wants lo
recognize in the ea rliest a nd fo undatio nal beliefs of his own faith community
me ta physically implausible, cosmologically incongruous or logically absurd
claims about reality. If, on the basis of some philosophical argument o r, more
comm only, rumo rs o f such an a rgumen t, th e b ib lical scholar comes to believe
that one or a nothe r traditi onal doct rine is deeply flawed in any o f th ese ways,
he o r she may we ll be less inclined to acknowledge in tima tions o r an ticipatio ns
of t he problema ti c fo rmulatio n in the authentic sayings o f Jesus or in the earliest witness o f the Church . Since the re is no pure ly mecha ni cal procedure fo r
text ual archeology on complex a ncie nt docum e nts, th ere is ample room wit hin
the paramete rs o f accepted scholarly practice for such philosophically inspired
subjective disinclinations to have the ir effect. If this, o r a nything like this, has
been a n o pe rative dyna mic in the developme nt o f biblical stud ies in the recent
past, the n we clearly have from this qu arte r no independent historical cha lle nge
to a classica l conce ption of Christian faith a nd doctrine--wc a rc me re ly directed
back Lo pure ly philosophical argu ments as pote ntial sources of tro uble. Whateve r the me rit of th is speculat io n about the possible psychological dynam ics
be hind some recen t work in biblical studies, the Christ ia n faith has been traditionally understood lo b e rooted in the en tirety of its canonical Scriptures, as
we ll as in the creeds, confessions a nd conciliar decrees of th e believing communit y. Any M a rcio nitc picking a nd choosing of favorite sources is unacceptable.
W he the r the fi rst C hristia n to com mit fai th t o papyrus had a pro positio nally
orie nted, incipie ntly doctrin al mindset or not, this is a funda me ntal orie nta tion
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o f Lhe C hristia n C hurch Lhroughoul Lhe ce nturi es, and one which cannol be
abandoned lightly.
W e m ay suppose, however, tha t it is not prim a rily to the do main of histo rical biblical studies Lhal Lindbeck alludes whe n he cites b roadly " historical studies" as implying " the time-conditioned relativit y of all doctrines." It is likely
that he has in mind ra the r some thing like this: Quite simply, mode rn histo rical
research has made us sensitive to the fact th at thought fo rms vary from culture
to culture, and from one historical pe riod lo a no the r. Re ligious tho ught fo rms
a re no exception. They seem Lo be thoroughly conditioned by Lhe tim es a nd
places within which they arise. As Lindbeck himself says later in his book:
The first-order trulh claims o f a re lig ion cha nge insofar as these a rise
fro m thc ... shifting wo rlds Lhat hum an beings inhabit. Wha t is la kc n lo
be real ity is in la rge part socially constructed a nd conseque ntly alte rs
in the course o f Lime. The universe o f th e a ncie nt Nea r East was very
diffcrcnl from tha t of Gree k philosophy, a nd both a rc dissimilar from
the mo de rn cosmos. Inevitably, the C hristia nized versions of Lhcse
vario us world pictures arc far from idc ntical.4
The a rgumc nl tha t Lindbeck, in effect, goes o n to give is th al since C hristi a n
claims aboul reality have been made in very diffc rc nl tim es a nd places, those
claims the mselves must b e viewed as deeply diffe re nt; thus, if doct rines a rc
claims about God, the world a nd hum a n existe nce, first-ord er claims about reality, Lhe n they have been importa ntly cha nging a nd d iffe ring over space a nd
Lime--thc rc is no single doctrine o f creation, or inca rna tion or salvat io n, but a
set of very diffe re nt time-conditioned cultural expressions of the faiths of differe nl C hristi a ns. Sure ly we want a conception of C hristia n doctrine suc h th at
the re is continuity in it. Thus, we can not view doctrin es as first-orde r truth
claims aboul reality. They a rc inst ead, in Lindbcck's vie w, gramma tical mies.
Or so he argues. But what of " the time-conditio ned relati1•ity o f a ll doctrines"
Lhal historical stud ies arc su pposed to unveil for the cognitive-propositional
view o f doctrine? Whal is relative to whal? Pe rh a ps Lindbeck means Lo suggest
Lhat since re lig ious claims a re, on his concept ion, functio ns of socially constructed wo rld-views, the truth o f such clai ms ca n be unde rstood only as intrasystcmi c truth, or truth-rcla tivc-to-th c-opcrativc-worldview. But th e me re existence of diffe rent conceptual sche mes does no t alone e ntai l tbe sema ntic re lativity of claims made within th ose sche mes, a ny more th a n the existe nce o f diffe ring theories in some domain o f scie ntific inqu iry alo ne e ntails scie ntific a ntircalism. An a rgum e nt is needed . And no argum e nt is fort hcoming whose contours a rc easily discernible a nd which might have a ny cha nce al a ll of cont ributing in a fo rceful way to dispatching the cognitive-p ro positional conceptio n of
C hristi a n doctrin e. What is a t work he re is one partic ul ar, philosophically
loaded, sociology o f knowledge, or perh aps b ette r, of belief, which see ms
strangely attractive t o ma ny conte mpo ra ry theologia ns. But fo r such a view
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there is no compelling argument or independe nt purchase on truth, aside from
a stipulativc truth-within-its-own-conceptual-fra mework which we arc free to
ignore.
Of course, Platonistic and Aristotelian me taphysics and moral theory we re
presumably unavailable to the great majority, if not all, of the biblical a uthors.
It does not follow at all from this that their own perspectives a nd claims ca nnot
be captured a nd unfolded in such philosophically a ttuned thought fo rm s. The
development of d octrine which e nsued from appropriating such thought forms
is something quite different from, and much more deeply continuous tha n, a
me re succession of distinct, time-conditioned linguistic artifacts. We can
unde rstand the medievals, the pa tristics and the biblical authors about as well
as we can understa nd each othe r. And we can disagree with the m. We arc not
limited to just noting that what is true-in- our-framework sometim es diffe rs
from what is true-in-their-framework, and to admitting that the very existe nce
of such a diffe re nce is itself a fact only in-our-framework. We can really engage the past. Nothing within the purview of modern historical studies has
shown oth erwise. Thus, again, from this direction the re is not, after all, a ny
decisive obstacle to working within the traditional unde rstand ing of C hristia n
faith and doctrine.
The mere existence of ongoing doctrinal disputes through the history o f the
Church, a nd the existe nce of metaphysical disputes related to these doctrin al
controve rsies, seems to be deeply troubling to many modern theologia ns. Or,
more spccilically, the fact that there is no huma nly ava ilable Archimidean poi nt
from which to resolve such disputes, no single, simple decision procedure for
adjudicating r ival doctrinal positions, seems to have been a cause for dismay
a mong recent theologians conte mpla ting the history of Christi an thought. I believe that it is concern over such matters which has served as a powerful mo tiva tion in recent years for the move toward theological anti-realism, or at least
toward the atte m pt lo develop a practically me taphysics-free fo rm of theological reflection. And yet, all too o fte n, the resulting reflection has not been free
of me taphysics at all, but rathe r has been constrained by a na turalistic or materialist me ta physics alien to the gospel and th e whole body of traditional C hristia n thought. If C hristian thinkers do not, as pa rt of their theological work,
seek to d evelo p and reline suitable philosophical too ls for the expression of
their faith, they inevitably just inherit their philosophical assumptions and dispositions fro m the culture around them. H erc is a modicum of truth be hind
one of Lindbeck's convictions no ted a bove. And, as I think Lindbeck, on reflection, would agree, not all such c ultural legacies are equally suita ble to the expression of C hristia n faith.
The lack of a simple algorithm for resolving doctrin al, or me ta physical, diffe re nces does not prevent ratio nal adjudication o f such diffe re nces. It just
makes it much more diflicult. Nor, as most cpistcmologists agree, does the unavailability of such a procedure in many other departments of huma n thought
prevent the attainment o f genuine propositional knowledge in these sphe res. It
has ofte n been said that a little philosophy is a da ngerous thing. I suspect that
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one reason for the significant divergence of assum ptions between numero us
contemporary academic theologians and the professional philosophers now
doing C hristian philosophical theology is t hat the th eologians have had a dangerous amount of philosophy in the course of their theological training. They
have had eno ugh lo sec problems in the t rad itio n, but not enoug h to equ ip
them to work carefull y th rough those problems.
It is not the conviction o f the philosophers now working on these topics
that t raditional lheologizing is without any se ri ous naws. The contrary conviction on the part of many will become clear in reading th eir recent publicatio ns.5
The shared assumption is rath er that the traditi on has substantive commitments well worth explo ring and relining, resources which merit detailed philosophical scrutiny and contemporary reapprop riatio n. Whatever Oaws there arc
sho uld be b rought to light as clearly and precisely as possible, so th at we might
seek lo eliminate them and do our part to capture anew th e d eep truths heretofore imper fectly expressed.
O ne would have thought that in the years si nce Lindbeck's book was written, or at least in the five years si nce it was published, the proof of the pudding
here would have been had in the tasting. A great deal of successful, illuminating work has been done during this time in precisely the direction deemed by
Lindbeck to be a dead-end. But, unfortunately, it seems th at many theologians
have not been kee n to follow these developm ents, to see where, in fact, they
might lead. Thus we find in a q uite recent essay by a prominent th eologian, the
repeated insistence that the whole framework of contemporary philosophy o f
religio n is fault y. In "Evidcntialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordo n
Kaufm an argues that current philosophical attentio n to religion errs fro m the
start by adopting three basic presuppositio ns shared by t raditional Christi an
theological thought.6 These three basic assumpt ions o r presuppositio ns p rovide
the focus, agenda and methods of current philosophical theology, as done by
philosophers. An d they are ass umptions which Ka ufm an believes have been
undermined altogethe r, rendered intellect uall y un acceptab le, by three corresponding modern develo pments. It is .remarkable to sec the degree to whi ch
Kaufm an just repeats some of the same worries voiced by Lindbeck, b ut in a
slightly different and interesting packaging which is worth our attentio n.
The first assum ptio n or presu pposition identified by Kaufman, we can call
" Religious Propositio nalism." This is simply the assum ption that certain crucial
propositio ns actually believed o r ad hered to by religious people can be fo und
beneath, or distilled out o f, th e complex of religious p ract ice, as themselves
proper objects, and the primary objects, of philosophical allention. A proposition is, by definitio n, a claim or assertion, the co nt ent o f a declarative or indicative sentence, a truth bearer o r, more ca utiously, the sort of thing which can be
said to be true or false, whi ch can be believed, doubted or d enied. The assumption of Religious Propositionalism, when brought to an examinatio n o f
Christianity, leads to an identification o f certain cru cial propositions as believed
b y Christians, and treats these p ropositions as such that belief th at they arc true
is partly constitutive of what it is to be a C hristian. Familiar examples of such

38

Morris

propositions would of course be the traditional claims that there is a God, that
Jesus is God incarnate, that God is a Divine Trinity and thnl hum an salvation
consists in being properly related lo God through Christ. It has been the practice of contemporary philosophers, when turning their attention to the Christian religion, to focus their efforts of analysis and evaluation on these and other
propositions commonly thought of as central lo Christianity.
Kaufman believes that Religious Propositionalism ignores the complex dynamic function of religious conceptions, symbols and utterances. IL is his contention that the modern understanding of human religious pluralism brings this
to our atte ntion. According to Kaufman, when we come to an intimate knowledge of the various, disparate human religious traditions, we find that what initially seem to be very different symbols, concepts and propositions arc actually
items which serve the same practical functions in each of the different religions.
H indu utterances and Christian utterances, sentences spoken in a religious context by the Hopi, or by a Buddhist, may appear lo serve lo convey very different
claims abou t reality. But Kaufman urges us to view this ap pearance as deceptive. Or so, at least, it seems that this is his point. In the holistic approach
meant to be taken to religion and religious uttera nces instead of Re ligious Proposit ionalism, Kaufman urges that ph ilosophers join his new breed of theologian in focusing more on the simibritics among religions in their practical fun ctions rather than on the awkward dissimilarities among them in their apparent
claims abou t reali ty.
But it is not easy lo gel clear on exactly what Kaufman finds unaccept able
in Religious Propositionalism. Is it that he thinks that Christian propositions
about God and humankind have fared poorly in the realm of scientific confirmation and so wa nts to take some approach other than a propositional one lo
the Christian faith? Or docs he endorse a radical semant ic thesis that from
first-order religious activities discn:le assessable propositions conceptually cannot be extracted? Sometimes it seems that he is motivated by the forme r consideration, sometimes the latte r. But it really doesn't matter since either reason is equa lly controversial. Unless we do att ribu te discernible, discrete religious beliefs to religious people, their religious behavior becomes totally
opaque and unintelligible. Moreover, it isn't even a question, finally, of
whether we as observers can abstract propositional attitudes, for example belief
states, and thus propositions, as the objects of those attitudes--rcligious people
repon having such belie fs. And those of us engaged in the study of religion who
arc for tunatc enough lo be insiders with respect to our object of study, know
first hand that certain pro positions arc crucial to Christian faith, as it was delivered lo us, and as we maintain it. Any semantic theory which is al odds with
such a plain fact has little to be said for it. And as for the worry that purported
theological propositions do not fa re well in our hard-headed day of empirical
inqui ry and scientific confirmation, recent philosophy of religion e ngaged in
doing wh:it Kaufman dislikes seems to be demonstrating qu ite the cont ra ry
Vl e W.
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The second presuppositio n o f recent philosophical work on religion rejected by Kaufman is what we have already referred to as "Theological Realism." This is the assumption, simply, that the propositions extracted from religious belief have as their inte nt objective truth. Or, lo pul it another way, it is
the assumption th at those religio us people making declarative utt erances about
God (and so forth) inte nd by doing so to express objective 1ru1hs about the way
things really are. H aving made this assumption, philosophers then go on to lest
religions by evaluating the purported truths or systems of purported truths they
appear lo contain.
Just as Kaufman seems lo think of Religious Propositionalism as semantically naive, he judges Theological Realism to be epistemologically naive. He,
like Lindbeck, clai ms that recent d evelopments in the socio logy of knowledge
have indicated both the holistic character of huma n tho ught a nd the relativity of
conceptual fram es, or frameworks. In light of this, he thinks that religions
should be viewed i11stmme11tally, not cognitively as a ttempts to articulate and
embrace tmths. Religion, from his perspective, functions rathe r " ... to present a
framework from within which basic orie ntation and mea ning for the whole of
human life can be found." 7 Ka ufm a n thus accordingly believes that philosophical priority ought to be given to questions about th e motivation of religious utterances, their function and their practical consequences, not lo questio ns
about their truth.
But the re are al least a couple of se rious problems he re. Quite apart fro m
the philosophical sla t us o f the sociological accounts of knowledge, o r rather, of
what is otherwise norm ally tho ught of as knowledge, the re are two difficulties
in Kaufman's diagnosis and recommendation which seem to me d ecisive. First,
if we seek a map to o rie nt us a nd guide o ur movements, we surely want a map
tha t is accurate. And a map of propositions, a framework for the orientation o f
hum an life, in order lo be accurate must be composed of truths. Thus, the re is
no driving a wedge between function here a nd the concern fo r truth.
It is true that, in orde r to determine what proposition a particular utte rance might be expressing, we have to unde rsta nd some thing about the function
of the utte rance in its context, but it docs not follow from this a t all that philosophe rs need to study the de tails of ritual and relig ious activity before they
can expect to have any proper philosophical objects for study. If we a rc tak ing
mainstream Christia n faith at face value and no t trying to be ultra-sophisticated
about it, it seems fairly straightforward, at least in broad outline, what Christianity proclaims, a nd thus what C hristi ans believe. And these objects of proclamation and belief are interesting and prope r object s o f philosophical inquiry in
their own right. Kaufm a n's insistence to the contrary is unpersuasive.
The third framework assumption or basic presupposition of contemporary
philosophy of religion th at Kaufm an rejects we can call "Conceptual Traditionalism." This is, roughly spea king, the assumption th at major religious concepts,
as they have developed over the centuries a nd have been ha nded down lo us,
have a certain integrity and have at least a dcfeasible privileged status as lit ob-
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jects o f philosophical a ttentio n. Conce rning what he refe rs to as " this symbol
'God '," Kaufm a n says:
We cannot take it for gra nted that this symbol has always meant the
same thing; nor can we assume that the meaning it carried in earlier
periods of history (whethe r biblical, o r the high Middle Ages, or the
Reformation) is the meaning which it should (or can) carry for us
tod ay.8
The intellectual development tha t Kaufm an thinks has ca used us to question
this assumption is, he says, our awareness th at many o f the proble ms o f the
twentieth century, from the H olocaust lo our curre nt ecological t roub les, arc
some how results of a mindset produced by traditional Christia n theology a nd
its many conceptions of God, man a nd nature forged in for me r centuries unde r
very diffe re nt cultural conditio ns.
This is to me th e most astonishing part of Kaufman's essay. The e normity
of his accusations along with the utte r paucit y of his evide nce fo r such connectio ns is one thing. But the philosophical relevance o f the alleged connections is
utterly myste rious. Even if one person or fifty million people a re e motionally
a nd a ttitudinally such tha t their handling of a concept o r a claim leads to disastrous consequences, that has absolutely nothing to do with whether the concept
in itself is coherent or philosophically inte resting and whether the claim is true.
The psychological questions a nd sociological questio ns can be raised, but they
serve in no way to undermine the properly philosophical qu estions of meaning,
cohe re nce a nd truth. To suggest otherwise without argum ent is utte rly impla usible, quite apart fro m the me rit o r de merit of the allegations about causal connectio ns between traditional theology and contemporary disaster.
In Kaufma n's essay, as in Lindbeck's book, we find the strong conviction
that what contemporary philosophe rs of religio n a re up to is wro ng-headed,
out -moded, unint e resting a nd futile. What we do not find a re a ny strong a rgume nts to back up this convict io n. We do, however, find the expression of a set
of opinio ns all too commo n nowadays a mong o the rwise astute a nd judicious
scho la rs in departm ents of thcolot,ry a nd divinity schools. IL is my hope that we
cont e mporary philosophers o f religion can convince our dubious co lleagues to
cease doing obeisance to Hume a nd Ka nt, to throw aside the needless self-imposed shackles of groundless mate rialism and self-defeating relativism, a nd to
jo in us as companions in exploring the vast intellect ual riches which fill o ur tradition.
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